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COMMENTS

COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE-RECENT DEVELOPMENTs-(A
SERVICE FOR RETURNING VETERANs)*-In discussing developments of
the criminal law during the war years it is convenient to group them
into the three conventional divisions-substantive, procedural, and
penal.

*

This comment is the second in a series of comments on recent developments in
the various fields of the law published and to be published by the REVIEW as a service
for returning veterans. See announcement, 44 MICH. L. REV. 149 (1945).
Previously published: Tracy, E'Oidence, 44 MICH. L. REv. 448 (1945).
To be published: Stason, Administrati'Oe Law; Shartel, Constitutional Law; James,
Corporation Law; Bradway, Domestic Relations; Ohlinger, Federal Jurisdiction and
Practice; Winters, State Adoption of the Federal Rules; Russel A. Smith, Labor Law;
Arthur M. Smith, Patent Law; Thurston, Restitution; Kauper, Taxation; Leidy, Torts;
Oppenheim, Trade Regulations; Simes, Trusts and Estates.
The reader may also be interested in New York University's publication, ANNUAL
SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAw, volumes 1-4, covering the years 1942-1945 respectively.
Volumes l and 2 are now being distributed. Of possible interest also is the series of
articles on recent developments in Indiana, 1940-1945, announced, 21 IND. L. J. 75
( l 946). The first two articles published are Gravit, "Procedure and Property," id. 76,
and Dunham, "Taxation," id. u3.
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I
The Substantive Law
The substantive criminal law-that which defines the particular
activities and concomitant states of mind which are punishable-is always less apt to be altered, and still less apt to be expanded, by judicial
decision than are certain phases of the civil-as distinct from criminallaw. Developments in what does or does not constitute crime are with
rare exception enactments of legislatures, rather than the product of
quasi-cryptic judicial legislation.
In every state, it may be assumed, some _statutory changes in
the substantive law have occurred during the war years. Most_ of the
change is basically unimportant-the routine grist of regulations
ground out to meet new conditions. In Michigan, for example, the
relative scarcity of commodities was recognized by such legislation as
prohibition of sale of dog meat or horse meat unless clearly so
labelled,1 and making the larceny of restricted or rationed goods
punishable twice as severely as the larceny of similar unrationed property. 2 Efficient protection of public safety was fostered by statutes
penalizing the reporting of fictitious crimes to the police,3 the making
of false statements to law enforcement radio broadcasting stations with
intent to mislead the police,4 and the malicious destruction of police or
fire department property.5 Strike activities were touched upon by
penalties for interference with the movement, loading, or unloading,
of vehicles transporting farm or commercial products,6 and for maliciously tampering with or injuring public utility property with intent
to disrupt communication or service. 7 Not, perhaps, as a war-time
measure, but merely as a measure of control over the misuse of intoxicating liquor, purchasers between twenty-one and twenty-five years
of age were required to show a "liquor purchase identification card." 8
These Michigan statutes, however, are no more than illustration
of legislative activities. What actually was done generally in other
states; what new offenses were created, or old prohibitions repealed
here and there throughout the country, it would serve no purpose to
list in detail here. An interested person needs only to look at the
recent session laws of his own state.
1

Mich. Comp. L. (Mason, 1943 Supp.) § 17115-477a.
Mich. Comp. L. (Mason, 1943 Supp.) § 17115-367a.
3
Mich. Comp. L. (Mason, 1943 Supp.) § 17u5-411¾. And see the common
law rule indicated by Rex v. Manley, [1933] I K.B. 529, note 20, infra.
4
Mich. Comp. L. (Mason, 1943 Supp.) § 17115-509._
~Mich.Comp. L. (Mason, 1943 Supp.) § 17115-377b.
6
Mich. Comp. L. (Mason, 1943 Supp.) § 17115-421b.
7
Mich. Comp. L. (Mason, 1943 Supp.) § 17115-383a.
8
Mich. Comp. L. (Mason, 1943 Supp.) § 17u5-141b.
2
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Louisiana, which recognizes no common law crimes as such, adopted
an entire new code of substantive criminal law in 1942.9 Its draftsmen
hesitated to repudiate expressly the doctrine of such decisions as lvlcB oyle v. United States 10 and State v. McMahon 11 to the effect that
"It is a well established rule of criminal procedure that criminal and
penal statutes are strictly construed in favor of the defendant and
against the State, both as to the charge and the proof/' 12 But the code
does forestall exaggeration of that rule by its provision that "the
articles of this code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes
not provided for herein..•. [But] all of its provisions shall be given
a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words,
taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with
reference to the purpose of the provision." 18 The chief effect of the
Louisiana Code is not creation of novel crimes, but clarification of those
already recognized, e.g., a one line definition of forgery; an explicit
definition of "insanity," which establishes the "right and wrong" test
and negatives the legal effect of "irresistible impulse"; the necessity
of a "breaking'' eliminated from the crime of "burglary" as defined
in the code.14
New California statutes make two interesting changes in the substantive law. A statute of 1941 15 had specifically prohibited prosecution
on the customary "manslaughter" charge for death caused by negligent
driving of a motor vehicle. It created a new, statutory crime which was
not committed by the ordinarily "negligent" driving that sufficed to
create liability under the pre-existing law. Instead, the statute required
that the basis of liability for death caused by operation of an automobile must be "reckless disregard, or wilful indifference to, the safety
of others." The statute thus created an odd situation. A defendant who
through real, serious negligence, less than reckless and wilful disregard of others, accidentally killed another in some way other than by
9

La. Acts (1942) Act 43•
283 U.S. 25, 51 S.Ct. 340 (1931).
11
234 Mo. 6u, 137 S. 872 (19u).
12
Id. at 614.
18
The prohibition of "extension by analogy" would appear to be a warning
against such extension as might follow the German notion of interpreting statutes
"consistently with Nazi world philosophy"-discussed, Preuss, "Punishment by Analogy in National Socialist Penal Law; 26 J. of CRIM. L. 847 (1936). The philosophy
of statutory interpretation is discussed, Hall, "Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal
Statutes;' 48 HARV. L. REv. 748 ( 193 5).
14
The Louisiana Code is explained and commented on, Morrow, "The Proposed Louisiana Criminal Code--An bpportunity and a Challenge," l 5 TULANE L.
REV. 415 (1941); Morrow, "The Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942-Opportunities
Lost and Challenges Yet Unanswered;' 17 TuLANE L. REv. l (1942); Morrow,
"Louisiana Blueprint," 17 TuLANE"L. REv. 351 (1943).
15
Cal. Stats. (1935) c. 764, p. 2141; Penal Code, motor vehicles,§ 500.
10
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driving an automobile could lawfully be convicted of manslaughter.
But the automobilist guilty of causing death by a precisely similar degree of negligence.could not be convicted,, This anomaly was corrected
by a statute in 1943, which restores the liability for manslaughter by
negligent driving of a motor vehicle, but still limits the penalty to
less than the punishment possible for other types of negligent homicide.16
A 1943 California statute also makes conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor punishable as a felony. 17 This is the result reached earlier by
judicial decision in Michigan.18 As illustrative of the lack of agreement which pervades the whole field of criminal law, a proposed new
Federal Code contains a :flatly conflicting provision which specifically
declares that "if, however, the offense, the commission of which is
the objective of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment
provided for such misdemeanor." This proposed Federal Code is the
work of a Congressional committee and was placed before Congress
as House Bill '5450. It makes some changes in the substantive law, but
chiefly combines existing statutes and clarifies them.19
A judicial application of principle, somewhat criticized as an extension of principle to create a new substantive crime, which occurred
in 1933, has been limited by a later decision. In Rex v. ManltJy 20 it
appeared that a woman had reported to the police that her handbag
had been forcibly taken from her by a robber. After the police had
spent some time in investigation the woman's report was found to
l;ave been wholly false, and she was prosecuted on the charge that by
16 Cal. Stats. (1943) c. 421, discussed by Kingsley, "Criminal Law," 17 So. CAL.
L. REV. 35 (1943).
This legislative special consideration for the automobilist seems to reflect a similar
consideration in the California motor vehicle speed laws which-though not in the
"penal code"-penalize reckless driving, Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1931) Act. 5128,
§ 113; make speeds of over 20 m.p.h. in business districts, 25 m.p.h. in residential
districts, or 45 m.p.h. on highways, prima facie evidence of reckless driving; and
then expressly provide that accurate evidence · of speed obtained by timing the defendant driver over a measured section of roadway shall not be admissible against
him, and that no police officer's testimony as to speed ~hall be competent if he was
not in full uniform, or was in an automobile not clearly marked as a police car,
when he obtained the evidence, id. § 155.
•
17 Cal. Stats. (1943) c. 554; 17 So. CAL. L. REv. 35 (1943).
18 People v. Causley, 299 Mich. 340, 300 N.W. III (1941); 40 M1cH. L.
REV. 905 (1942).
19 H. R. 5450, 78th Cong., 2d sess. (1944). It is discussed, B.arron, "Some
Notes by the Reviser of the Federal Criminal Laws," 6 F. B. J. 141 (1945). Incidentally the "Preliminary Draft" of 1944 still penalizes the captain of a ship which
hovers off the coast for the purpose of landing slaves.
20
[1933] I K.B. 529.
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giving such false information she did "unlawfully effect a public mischief." The defense contended that the indictment "disclosed no offense
known to the law." The prosecution relied strongly on Rex -u. Higgins 21
to the effect that "all offenses of a public nature, that is, all such acts
or attempts as tend to the prejudice of the community, are indictable." 22 Some criticism of this decision as an illogical, unjustifiable
extension of the principle was uttered. Then, in 1943, an Australian
court virtually repudiated it on a "distinction..,, A truck driver whose
vehicle had been injured through his own negligence gave the police
a fictitious account of someone else's crime as the cause of the injury.
When he was brought to book for having thus started the police on a
wild goose chase the court declined to apply the principle relied on
in the Manley decision to "the every day practice of wrong doers in
trying to avert suspicion from themselves." 28

II
The Procedural Law ,
In the procedural field, the most notable development is the approval by the United States Supreme Court and its report to Congress
of a set of Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States. 2<1 And perhaps the most noteworthy characteristic of
that noteworthy development is the lack of change, rather than the
extent of change, accomplished by the rules.
Proposals made and rejected covered a wide variety of problems.
One was a proposal that a defendant's failure to take the witness stand
might be commented on by judge and counsel and considered by the
jury, but-to meet the conventional objection-that if he should take
the stand his previous criminality could not be revealed to the jury
under pretense of attacking his credibility as a witness. The proposal
21
22

.

2 East 5, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (1801).
In Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 407 (1881), in holding the making

of false entries in election books to be punishable, the court adverted to a general
principle that "all such crimes as especially affect public society are indictable at
common law. The test is not whether precedents can be found in the books, but
whether they injuriously affect the publi~ police and economy." ·
28
Rex v. Kataja, [1943] V1cT. L. R. 145. Criticized, Cowen, "Acts Tending
to the Public Mischief," 18 AusT. L. J. 38 (1944).
MA Congressional act of June 29, 1940, c. 445, 54 Stat. L. 688; 18 U.S.C.
(1940) § 687, empowered the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for proceedings in
criminal cases, with the proviso that "such rules shall not take effect until they shall
have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular
session thereof and until after the close of such session." Proposed rules were prepared
br. a committee, submitted to the Bar for criticism, and eventually formulated satisfactorily to the Court. They were approved by the Court December 26, 1944, and
reported to Congress at the beginning of its January, 1945, session.
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was rejected, however. As such comment by court or counsel has not
yet been either approved or condemned by the Supreme Court, the
failure of the Rules to say anything at all about it merely leaves its
legal propriety as well as its merits still open to controversy; district
attorneys and trial judges are as much in the dark about its permissibility as ever.25
Other proposals which were rejected would have precluded the
imprisonment of mere witnesses for long periods of time; would have
made inadmissible as evidence statements of an accused person made
while he was in custody without having been taken before a magistrate;
would have required the judge to appoint a foreman of the trial jury
as he does of the grand jury; would have permitted waiver of jury
trial by the defendant only on advice of counsel; would have given
the defendant an absolute right to be tried without a jury if he so
desires; 26 would have placed no time limit on motions for new trial because of newly discovered evidence; would have permitted an "alternate" juror to take the place of a regular juror who becomes incapacitated after the jury has retired; et cetera ad lib.
Preliminary drafts of the Rules contained provisions authorizing
the restricted use of depositions by the government; providing for
certain voluntary pre-trial proceedings looking toward simplification
of issues, admissions of fact and authenticity of documents, the number of expert witnesses to be used, and settlement of other matters
which might aid in disposition of the proceedings; and requiring
notice of the defendant's intention to offer evidence of an alibi. These,
,however, were all stricken from the draft as approved by the Court.
A proposal to require an oath of secrecy of witnesses appearing before grand juries was rejected, although the jurors themselves, as well
as attorneys, interpreters and stenographers are precluded from revealing the proceedings except under certain conditions. The mooted question of whether or not trial jurors may take written notes of testimony
was left open to local preferences. The Rules require a complaint "to
be made on oath before a commissioner" but leave to local practice
25

The American Bar Association some years ago interrogated the judges of .five
states wherein comment on the defendant's failure to take the witness stand is per- mitted; of the 178 who replied, only 5 thought the practice not desirable; 63 A.B.A.
REP. 591 (1938). Members of the American Law Institute at an annual meeting voted
nearly two to one in favor of permitting such comment; 9 AM. LAW INST. PROC. 202.
The American Bar Association, 56 A.B.A. REP. 137, 159 (1931); the Attorney General's Conference on Crime, 2 I A.B.A.J. 9 at Io ( I 93 5) ; and various state organizations, have declared themselves as favoring the propriety of comment, l 2 Wis. L. REV.
361 (1937); 22 CoRN. L. Q. 392 (1936). Its constitutionality has never been determined.
26 As is now the rule in, e.g., Mich. Comp. L. (1929) § 17131; and Ill. Rev.
Stats. (1943) c. 38, § 736.
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whether or not it must contain more than an allegation of information
and belief. Various other incidents of practice, concerning which uniformity is sometimes advocated, were left purposely indefinite.
Changes which are actually made by the Rules in existing practices
are surprisingly few. For the most part-as, e.g., in approving the
impanelling of "alternate jurors," or authorizing waiver of jury trial
and trial by the court or a so-called jury of less than twelve-the
Rules merely restate practices which have been recognized and followed. They do, however, make some important changes, namely:Simplification of the process of removal in cases of arrest in
districts mo miles or more from the district in which trial is to
be held; elimination of necessity for formal removal proceedings
if the arrest is in another district of the same state or a district of
another state at a place less than mo miles from the place where
the warrant was issued.
Provision that warrants for arrest may be executed anywhere
within the jurisdiction of the United States, instead of only in the
district of issue; and that the arresting officer need not have the
warrant actually in his possession at the time of making the arrest.21 Permissive use of summons to appear instead of formal
arrest.
Prosecution of offenses not punishable by death by information, instead of by indictment, if the accused person consents thereto in writing after having been informed of his rights.
Clarification of the formal necessities of indictment by express
provision that it need not contain a formal commencement, a ·
formal conclusion, or any other matter not necessary to plain,
concise statement of the offense charged.
The elimination of all pleas,-except the accusation, and pleas
of guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere-demurrers and motions
to quash, and the substitution of simple motions to dismiss or to
grant appropriate relief. 28
·
27

This was already the statutory rule in a number of states.

28 The Rules, as proposed or approved, have been discussed by Waite, "The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," 27 J. AM. Juo. Soc. IOI (1943); Berge,
"The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 353 (1943);
Harne, "Proposed Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure: Final Draft," 42 MICH. L.
REv. 623 (1944); Holtzoff, "Reform of Federal Criminal Procedure," 12 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. II9 (1944); Holtzoff, "Codification of Federal Criminal Procedure,"
6 F.B.J. 18 (1944); Stewart, "Comments on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,"
8 JoHN MARSHALL L. Q. 296, u9 (1943); Longsdorf, "The New Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure," 18 CAL. S.B.J. 263 (1943); Orfield, "The Preliminary Draft of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," 22 TEX. L. REV. 37, 194 (1944); Tibbs,
"Criminal Procedure Under Proposed Federal Rules Compared with Wisconsin
Statutes," 28 MARQ. L. REv. 75 (1944); Barron, "Some Notes by the Reviser of the
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Some changes in procedure have been brought about by the courts
themselves. Still adhering to the Prohibition-fostered proposition that
evidence obtained by unreasonable search can not be used over proper
objection, there has been occasional suggestion, albeit very mild suggestion, that judges are willing to narrow their definition of "unreasonable." In the Agnello case the court had laid down the flat
proposition that "one's house cannot lawfully be searched without a
search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein." 29
In the Carroll case decided a few months earlier 30 the court had held
search of an automobile without warrant to be "reasonable" because
the automobile might be removed from the jurisdiction before a warrant could be obtained. In the Agnello case it was as obvious that the
evidence itself-cocaine-could have been, and probably would have
been, removed beyond recovery before a warrant could have been
obtained. Yet in repudiating use of the evidence against Agnello the
eourt, though it discussed the Carroll decision, ignored that practical
point of reasonableness and, though it used the phrasing of reasonableness, seems to lay down a rule of law, an absolute right instead of a
relative one, that "the search of a private dwelling without a warrant
· is, in itself, unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws." Following this,
an Oklahoma court, in a Prohibition case, held that a lawful airest
in the street outside the arrestee's house did not carry with it a privilege
of searching the house.81 In State v. McCollum, 32 however, the Washington court held that search of a house was reasonable under the circumstances, .despite absence of a warrant and despite the fact that
arrest had occurred outside the house, on the day previous.88 In United
States v. Davis 84 the Circuit Court, while expressly denying that Congress, by making business "subject to regulatiol).," could'authorize any
inspection of books and premises without regard to legal process, yet
held entrance into a gasoline station and seizure of unlawful coupons
after an arrest outside the station to have been reasonable. And a fedFederal Criminal Laws," 6 F.B.J. 141 (1945); Dession, "The Proposed Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure," 18 CoNN. B. J. 58 (1944); Holtzoff, "Codification of Federal
Criminal Procedure," 4 F.R.D. 275 (1945).
The Rules were discussed in detail at an institute meeting under the auspices of
New York University Law School, February 15 and 16, 1946. It is understood that a
printed report of the discussion will soon be published, obtainable from the Dean of
that school.
29
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 at 32, 46 S.Ct. 4 (1925).
8
°Caroll v. United States, 267 U.S'. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925).
81
Wallace v. State, 42 Okla. Cr. 143, 275 P. 354 (1929).
32
17 Wash. (2d) 85, 136 P. (2d) 165 (1943).
88 It must be conceded, however, that the Washington court had never shown
whole-hearted approval of the federal rule of exclusion.
84
(C.C.A. 2d, 1945) 151 F. (2d) 140.
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eral district court decision, United States v. Bell,3 5 while by no means
repudiating the limits upon search within the house emphasized by
United States v. Lefkowitz,3 6 makes clear the district judge's belief
that the limits are not arbitrary but depend upon reasonableness under
the circumstances.87
The proposition that an accused person can permissibly waive his
right to trial by jury even in criminal cases and be validly tried without
a jury-at least if the prosecution consents-which seemed to have
been soundly posited by Patton v. United States, 38 was somewhat discredited by a 1942 decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the
Second Court,89 wherein Judge Learned Hand expounded the opinion
that waiver of jury trial by a defendant, specifically and in writing,
could not be considered effective unless the defendant had made the
waiver after advice of counsel. The defendant in the particular case
had been advised by the court to retain counsel but had insisted that
he was himself conversant with law and preferred to handle his own
case without advice, and thereafter he "moved to have the case tried
by a judge without a jury, and signed a consent in the following words:
'I do hereby waive a trial by jury in the above entitled 'Case, having
been advised by the court of my constitutional right.'" Having been
found guilty by the trial judge, and been sentenced to the penitentiary,
he sought release by habeas corpus proceedings. The appellate court
specifically found that the trial had been fair and judgment had been
warranted by the evidence. lt said also that "there is reason to suppose that in fact he did not suffer by submitting his guilt to a judge
rather than to a jury." Nevertheless the court held the trial invalid
merely because he had not formally consulted with an attorney before
waiving the jury. Such a decision strongly suggests that court's complete disapproval of the whole idea of waiver, and an attempt to
limit its use to the narrmyest field. As the decision stood, it left the
problem of waiver of jury trial in almost as much confusion as existed
before the Patton case.40
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its approval
of waiver of jury trial and reversed the circuit court, saying: "The
8

(D.C. Cal.) 48 F. Supp. 986 (1943).
285 U.S. 452, 52 S.Ct. 420 (1932).
87
The "criterion of reasonableness" as related to search and seizure is discussed,
42 M1cH. L. REv. 147 (1943).
88
281 U.S.· 276, 50 S.Ct. 253 (1930).
89
United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 126 F. (2d)
774.
40
That problem, prior to the Patton decision, is discussed, Oppenheim, "Waiver
of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases," 25 M1cH. L. REv. 695 (1927); Grant, "Waiver
of Jury Trial in Felony Cases," 20 CAL. L. REv. 132 (1931); Durgan and Galey,
''Waiver of Jury Trial in Felony Cases," IO ORE. L. REv. 366 (1931).
~

86
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short of the matter is that an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice, and with the considered approval of the court, may
waive trial by jury, and so likewise may he competently and intelligently waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel. There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent an accused from choosing to have his
fate tried before a judge without a jury even though, in deciding what
is best for himself, he follows the guidance of his own wisdom and not
that of a lawyer." 41 Unfortunately for certainty as to what the Court
may decide in the future, in view of its demonstrated willingness to
reverse its own opinions, the decision was not unanimous, three justices
dissenting. Justice Murphy declared explicitly: "Because of these
[Constitutional] provisions, the fundamental nature of jury trial, and
its beneficial effects as a means of leavening justice with the spirit of
the times, I do not concede that the right to a jury trial can be waived
in criminal proceedings in the Federal Courts." 4 ?
Another Supreme Court decision left a very definite mark on the
procedure of enforcement. In McNabb v. United States 48 it appears
that the defendant had been arrested at about two A.M. on a Thursday,
but was not brought before a magistrate until sometime on Saturday,
though the federal law requires that an arrested person be taken "immediately" before an officer authorized to make commitments. In the
meantime, he had been questioned by officers and made a confession
which was admitted in evidence against him. This use of the confession
was alleged as error. An appellate court might, of course, have found
-such a confession to have been "compelled" by the force of the questioning, or in some other way, and for that reason inadmissible. But
in this case the Court expressly declined to call the confession objectionable as having been involuntary or compelled. Instead the Court
created out of whole cloth a new rule of evidence, perhaps purposely
rather unprecisely expressed, the gist of which is that a confession,
voluntary though jt may be, obtained "by so flagrant a disregard" of
the officer's legal duty to take the defendant before a magistrate is
not admissible. 44
41
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 605, 63 S.Ct. 236
(1942). Discussed, 41 MrcH. L. REV. 495 (1942); id. 937 (1943).
42
In a still later proceeding, 320 U.S. 220, 64 S.Ct. 14 (1943), the Supreme
Court sent the case back for a determination of fact as to whether or not McCann had
"intelligently-with full knowledge of his rights and capacity to understand them"
waived his right. That fact was found against him by the trial court, 3 F.R.D. 396
(1944). He then sought release by attacking the grand jury proceedings, but the lower
court's refusal to grant release on that ground was affirmed, United States ex rel.
McCann v. Thompson, (C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 604.
48 318 U.S.,332, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1943).
44 The decision is discussed, Waite, "Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence,"
42 MrcH. L. REv. 679 (1944); 56 HARV. L. REv. 1008 (1943). See also 22 TEX.
L. REV. 473 (1944).

COMMENTS

The judicial legislation evoked considerable criticism,4 5 as being
judicial legislation, as unwise legislation, and as vague and uncertain
legislation-. The new rule of inadmissibility was somewhat more closely
defined, however-and perhaps therefore-in a later decision. One
James Mitchell was arrested on charges of house-breaking and larceny
and taken to the police station. Immediately on arrival there he confessed his guilt-a confession clearly made before the time for taking .
him before a magistrate had run. After that, however, he was held for
a week before being brought before a magistrate. Because the confession was used in evidence against him, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, in deference to "the farreaching innovation in the established rules of evidence" of the McNabb decision. From the circuit court's neglect to consider the fact
that the confession was actually obtained while the police were not in
dereliction of duty, it seems not improbable that the reversal was
intended to "smoke out" the extent to which the Supreme Court would
go.46
The Supreme Court in due course, admitted the McNabb decision
to have been legislation, saying, "Practically the whole body of the
law of evidence governing criminal trials in the federal courts has been
judge-made. . . . The McNabb decision was merely another expression of this historic tradition. . . . " The Court makes, in this connection, an interesting distinction between its powers to make new rules of
evidence for the federal courts and its lack of corresponding power
in respect of state courts. "In cases arising from the state courts in
matters of this sort," it says, "we are concerned solely with determining
whether a confession is the result of torture, physical or psychological,
and not the offspring of reasoned choice. . . . But under the duty of
formulating rules of evidence for federal prosecutions, we are not
confined to the constitutional question of ascertaining when a confession comes of a free choice and when it is extorted by force, however
subtly applied." But it clearly limited the scope of the new rule by
reversing the circuit court's reversal of conviction in the Mitchell case.
"Here [in the Mitchell case, as distinguished from the McNabb conditions] there was no disclosure induced by illegal detention, no evidence was obtained in violation of legal rights." The subsequent unlawful detention of Mitchell did not make the confessions inadmissible,
said the Supreme Court, because they "were not elicited through
illegality." There is still a speciousness in the "clarification" of the
McNabb rule, however, because even the Mitchell case does not leave
one quite certain whether a confession obtained during a period of
45

See Waite, "Results of the McNabb Case," 42 MICH. L. REv. 909 (1944).
4,a Mitchell v. United States, (C.A.D.C. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 426.
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illegal detention but not elicited because of that detention is or is not
'inadmissible.47
•
The distinction so clearly made in the statement just quoted between the Supreme Court's control over state courts in respect of confessions obtained by compulsion, and its greater power to make new
rules of evidence for use in federal courts, indicates that the McNabb
decision was not expected to bind state courts, though the casual statement quoted hereafter from Lyons v. Oklahoma 48 carries a different
suggestion.49
Another procedural development was emphasized, if not inaugurated, in another r944 Supretpe Court decision. 50 Ware and Ashcraft
had been convicted of murder by a Tennessee court and the conviction
had been affirmed by the state supreme court. They then carried
the matter to the United States Supreme Court on the contention that
47

United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896 (1944). The majority•
opinion spoke of the McNabb confession having been "extracted •.• by continuous
questioning for many hours under psychological pressure"; which suggests that it
was inadmissible as having been obtained by means of the detention, not merely during
it. Justice Recd, however, made. his understanding clear: "As I understand McNabb
v. United States as explained by the Court's opinion of today, it is that where there has
· been illegal detention of a prisoner, joined with other circumstances which are deemed
by the Court contrary to proper conduct of federal prosecutions, the confession -will
not be admitted. Further this refusal of admission is required even though the detention plus the conduct do not together amount to duress or coercion.••• However,
even as explained I do not agree that the rule works a wise change in federal procedure. In my view detention without commitment is only one factor for consideration
in reaching a conclusion as to whether or not a confession is voluntary." id. at p. 71.
A number of state courts have treated the McNabb case as though it were a
matter of compelled testimony; e.g., Palmore v. State, 244 Ala. 22 7 at 229, I 2 S.
(2d) 854 (1943); Daugherty v. State, 154 Fla. 308 at 322, 17 S. (2d) 290 (1944);
Cavazos v. State, 146 Tex. Cr. 144 at 148, 172 S.W. (2d) 348 (1943).
48
322 U.S. 596, 605, 64 S.Ct. 1208 (1944).
49
The McNabb rule has been held as not binding by state courts, e.g., State v.
Browning, 206 Ark. 791 at 793, 178 S.W. (2d) 77 (1944); Cahill v. People, I I I
Col. 29 at 45, 137 P. (2d) 673 (1943); People v. Malinski, 292 N.Y. 360 at 386,
55 N.E. (2d) 353 (1944).
That the Supreme Court intended it to be so limited is further suggested by
Justice Jackson's unqualified statement one week later, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143, I 59, 64 S.Ct. 921 ( I 944), that, "This Court never yet has held that the
Constitution denies a State the right to use a confession just because the confessor was
questioned in custody, where it did not also find other circumstances that deprived him
· of a 'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.' " He obviously thinks of
the McNabb decision as one, as he puts it, which "applies rules as to the admissibility
of confessions, based on our own conception of permissible procedure, and in which
we may embody restrictions even greater than those imposed upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment. But we have no such supervisory power over state courts."
50
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 3:t2 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944).

COMMENTS

the conviction was based on the use of forced confessions, hence a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment was involved. The state trial court
had left the issue of voluntariness of the confession to the jury, declining "to hold, as a matter of law, that reasonable minds might not
differ on the question." The Supreme Court, acting of course as an
appellate body, using "facts which are not in dispute at all," reached
the conclusion that Ashcraft's confession was not volµntary but compelled, overrode the Tennessee supreme court, and reversed Ashcraft's conviction.
Justice Jackson, dissenting, indicates the novelty of the majority opinion:
"A sovereign state is now before us, summoned on the charge
that it has obtained convictions by methods so unfair that a federal court must set aside what the state courts have done. Heretofore the State has had the benefit of a presumption of regularity
and legality...• In determining these issues of fact ( the voluntariness of confessions), respect for the sovereign {:haracter of the
several states always has constrained this court to give great weight
to findings of fact of state courts. While we have sometimes gone
back of state court determinations to make sure whether the guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment have or have not been
violated, in close cases the decisions of state courts have often
been sufficient to tip the scales in favor of affirmance.
"As we read the present decision the court in effect declines
to apply these well-established principles. Instead it: ( r) substitutes for determination on conflicting evidence [ of] the question
whether this confession was actually produced by coercion, a presumption that it was, on a new doctrine that examination in custody
of this duration is 'inherently coercive'; ( 2) it makes that presumption irrebuttable-i.e., a rule of law-because, while it goes
back of the state decisions to find certain facts, it refuses to resolve
conflicts in evidence to determine whether otlier of the State's
proof is sufficient to overcome such presumption; and, in so doing,
(3) it sets aside the findings by the courts of Tennessee that on
all the facts this c~mfession did not result from coercion, either giving those findings no weight or regarding them as immaterial." u
61
Id. at I 57. Concerning Justice Jackson's last point, the majority opinion states
at the beginning an assumption "that neither the trial court nor the Tennessee Supreme
Court actually held as a matter of fact that petitioners' confessions were 'freely and
voluntarily made.'" Those courts had merely declined to reject as unreasonable the
jury's finding of that fact.
The Ashcraft decision is discussed, 57 HARV, L. REv. 919 (1944); 45 CoL, L.
REV. 660 (1945); 30 IowA L. REv. 102 (1945).
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Perhaps the significance of the Ashcraft decision is expressed also
by the statement in Lyons v. Oklahoma 52 which, though not essential
to the actual decision, reads, "The Fourteenth Amendment is a protection against criminal trials in state courts conducted in such a manner
as amounts to a disregard of 'that fundamental fairness essential to
the very concept of justice,' and in a way that 'necessarily prevents a
fair trial.'" 53

.

The right of a defendant in a criminal case to have the benefit of
representation by counsel has been established beyond question, but
in Betts v. Brady 54 the Supreme Court made clear its opinion that the
~'due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not absolutely
require -that counsel' be furnished by the state to a defendant merely
because he is not able to employ his own. After a detailed discussion of
state constitutional provisions and their various interpretations the
majority opinion concludes:
"This material demonstrates that in the great majority of the
States, it has been the considered judgment of the people, their
representatives a1).d their courts that appointment of counsel is
not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial. On the contrary,
the matter has generally been deemed one of legislative policy.
In the light of this evidence, we are unable to say that the concept of due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment
obligates the States, whatever may be their own views, to furnish
counsel in every such case." 1111
The dissenting opinion of Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy
said forcefully:
"This Court has just declared that due process of law is denied
if a trial is conducted in such a manner that it is 'shocking to the
universal sense of justice' or 'offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right.' On another occasion, this Court
has recognized that whatever is 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' . -; . is within the procedural protection afforded by the
52

322 U.S. 596, 605, 64 S.Ct. 1208 (1944).
The extent to which the Supreme Court has gone in freeing through habeas
corpus proceedings persons convicted in state courts is excellently expounded by
Holtzoff, "Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts," 25 BosT. UNiv. L.
REV. 26 (1945).
5
°' 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942) noted 42 CoL. L. REv. 1205 (1942);
91 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 78 (1942); 16 So. CAL. L. REv. 55 (1942).
55 The opinion adds, however, that "Every court has power, if it deems proper,
to appoint counsel where tha~ course seems to be required in the interest of fairness."
53
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constitutional guaranty of due process.G6 The right to counsel
in a criminal proceeding is 'fundamental.' .•. Gr
"A practice cannot be reconciled with 'common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right' which subjects innocent men to
increased dangers of conviction merely because of their poverty.... Most of the states have shown their agreement by constitutional provisions, statutes, or established practice judicially
approved, which assure that no man shall be deprived of counsel
merely because of his poverty. Any other practice seems to me to
defeat the promise of our democratic society to provide equal
justice under the law." Gs
The law of arrest was altered by statute in New Hampshire in
941 G9 to the extent of permitting a peace officer to stop and question
any person whom he reasonably suspects of having committed a crime,
or of being about to commit one, and, if the person's answers are not
satisfactory, authorizing the officer to detain the suspect not to exceed
four hours for further investigation.
The statute also drastically and wisely changes the common law
of resistance to unlawful arrest by making it the duty of an arrested
person to submit himself without resistance, regardless of the lawfulness of the arrest, if he knows that it is being made by a peace officer.60
A further important change is the specific provision that an arrest
by a peace officer without a warrant is lawful "whenever a felony has
actually been committed by the person arrested, regardless of the
reasons which led the officer to make the arrest." 61
Rhode Island, in the same year, enacted an essentially similar
statute,62 and in addition authorized peace officers to arrest without
warrant for misdemeanor not committed in their presence if the misI

Gs Citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 327, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937).
Gr Citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 70, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932); Grosjean

v. American Press Co. 297 U.S. 233, 243-244, 56 S.Ct. 444 (1936).
Gs 316 U.S. 455 at 475, 476, 64 S.Ct. 1208 (1944). The new rules referred to
above require the federal courts to appoint counsel for defendants "unable to obtain
counsel"-but leave open the definition of inability.
9
G N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 423, § 21.
60
N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 423, § 24.
61 Id., § 25.
An essentially similar, but apparently less explicitly worded statute, has long
existed in a number of other states but has been persistently ignored. See Waite, ''Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons," 31 M1cH. L. REv. 749 (1933).
62
It is even more specific, if possible, than the New Hampshire statute in making
arrest lawful· if the person has in fact committed a felony, even though "the officer did
not believe him guilty or on unreasonable ground entertained belief in his guilt."
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demeanant has fled from the scene of the crime or is a non-resident
of the state and cannot be arrested later. 68
'
Both 'statutes clarify the somewhat confused common law as to the
amount of force which may be used to effectuate an arrest on a felony
charge, by declaring specifically that, when necessary he "may use
force dangerous to ,human life to make a lawful arrest for committing
or attempting to commit a felony." 64
Danger of over zeal or abuse of the arrest privilege by peace officers
is met by a provision that "in an action for false arrest or false imprisonment, the plaintiff, if successful, may be awarded punitive damages
in addition to compensatory damages." 6a
-

III
The Penal Law
In the field of, penology, the Youth Correction Authority Act,
proposed by the American Law Institute in June of I 940, urged a
complete departure from the "penal" basis of treatment of convicts.
Seventy-five years ago 'a Declaration of Principles of the American
Prison Congress said explicitly that, "the treatment of criminals by
society is for the protection of society. . . . Hence the supreme aim
of prison discipline is the reformation of criminals, not the infliction
of vindictive suffering." This was in effect a repudiation of the
fallacious and more or less hypocritical theory of prevention by punishment. The Correction Act was the long delayed flowering of this notion
into definite proposal for practical application. In epitome the act proposed the sentencing of convicted youths not to a penitentiary-a place
of punishment-but to the custody and control of a rehabilitative commission, which should be responsible for three basic functions: (1) To
keep the offender safely segregated from society, or otherwise under
supervision, for so long as-but only so long as-his unrestricted freedom might be dangerous. ( 2) While the offender is in custody-whether fo prison, or at large under supervision-to investigate thoroughly •the causes of his criminality and to use every practicable,
68

R.I. Acts and Resolves (1941) c. 982.
The confusion in the common law as to the right to use lethal force is dicussed, Pearson, "The Right to Kill in Making Arrests," 28 M1cH. L. REv. 957
(1930); Waite, "Some Inadequacies in the Law of Arrest," 29 M1cH. L. REv, 448,
464 (1931).
65
§ I 3. These New Hampshire and Rhode Island statutes are somewhat garbled
-adoptions of a Uniform Arrest Statute proposed by the Interstate Committee on Crime•.
See, concerning it, Warner, "Investigating the Law of Arrest," 26 A.B.A.J. I 51
(1940); Warner, "The Uniform Arrest Act," 28 VA. L. R.Ev. 315 .(1942); Radzinowicz and Turner, "Modern Trends in the American Law of Arrest," 21 CAN, B.,
REv. 191 (1943); Baker, "Arrest Act," 32 J. OF CRIM. L. 205 (1941).
64
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humane means of correcting those causes-training in trade skills,
surgery, psychiatric treatment, or anything else called for. (3) After
the offender's release, not only to keep watch over him in a negatively
crime preventive sense, but actively to assist him, both with counsel and
financial help, to abstain from further cr:ime. 66
These proposals were-to a limited extent-adopted by the California legislature in 1941.01 They were also embodied in a, bill introduced into Congress in I 942 by a committee of federal judges
appointed by the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges. This proposal
was referred to the judiciary committee of the House, but got no
further. 68

---*---

For anyone interested in refreshing his memory of the criminal
law in general, rather than in recent dev.elopments only, a number of
recent decisions and discussions in addition to those cited in the foregoing notes should prove helpful. 00

John B. Waitet
APPENDIX
CITATIONS WHICH MAY BE HELPFUL "REFRESHERS."

I. Substantive Law:
Decision Notes and Short Comments:
Attempt distinguished from preparation: 32 KY. L. J. 207 (1944). Criminality
of financial aid to a fugitive: United States v. Shapiro, (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) l 13 F.
(2d) 891, 13 RocKY MT. L. REv. 371 (1941). Forgery: People v. Mau, 377 Ill.
199, 36 N.E. (2d) 1235 (1941), 26 MARQ. L. REv. 165 (1942), 30 ILL. B. J. 297
(1942). Guilt of injured party as a defense: State v. Mellenbergcr, 163 Ore. 233, 95
P. (2d) 709 (1939), 19 NEB. L.B. 190 (1940); Roberts v. State, 186 Miss. 732,
191 S. 823 (1939), 13 Miss. L. J. 270 (1941). Homicide, self-defense, duty to retreat: People v. Ligouri, 284 N.Y. 309, 31 N.E. (2d) 37 (1940), IO BROOKLYN L.
,
66

Copies of the Act itself should be obtainable from the American Law Institute,
3400 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa.
The various theories of crime prevention; the extent to which truly rehabilitative,
as distinct from merely punitive, methods have actually been put into operation; and
the extent to which they could be put into operation under existing state laws, are
discussed in considerable detail in WAITE, THE PREVENTION OF REPEATED CRIME
(1943).
67
Cal. Stats. (1941) c. 937; Welfare and Institutions Code, div. 2.5, § 1700 ff.
See also, Kingsley, "Criminal Law," l 7 So. CAL. L. REv. 3 5 ( l 943).
68
H.R. 2140, 78th Cong. 1st sess. (1943). The whole subject of "Correction
of Youthful Offenders" is discussed by var,ious writers in 9 L. & CoNTEM. PROB.
579 ff. (1942), the "Proposed Federal Corrections Act" being dealt with by Judge
Orie L. Phillips, at p. 650. See also, "Reform in Federal Penal Procedure," 53 YALE
L. REv. 773 (1944); Hinks, "Proposed Federal Corrections Act," 16 CoNN. B. J.,
267 (1942); WA!TE, THE PREVENTION OF REPEATED CRIME (1943).
69 See APPENDIX infra.
Professor of Law, Uni;ersity of Michigan Law School.-Ed.
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REV. 300 (1941). Homicide, proximate cause: People v. Goodman, 44 N.Y.S. (2d)
715 (1943), 13 FoRDHAM L. REv. 104 (1944). Homicide in commission of felony:
Whitfield v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 111, 128 S.W. (2d) 208 (1939), 29 KY. L.
REv. 128 (1940). Insanity, irrestible impulse: State v. Jackson, 346 Mo. 474, 142
S.W. (2d) 45 (1940), 6 Mo. L. REv. 212 (1941); 21 CHI-KENT L. REv. 94
(1942); Simecek v. State, 243 Wis. 439, IO N.W. (2d) 161 (1943), 28 MARQ.
L. REv. 47 (1944). Larceny distinguished from false pretenses: Whitmore v. State,
238 Wis. 79, 298 N.W. 194 (1941), 32 J. OF CmM. L. 555 (1942). Larceny by
wife of husband's property: People ex rel. Rossiter, 173 Misc. 268, 17 N.Y.S. (2d)
30 (1940), 15 ST. JoHN L. REv. 103 (1940); People ex rel. Felmere v. Rapp. 180
Misc. 839, 44 N.Y.S. (2d) 410 (1943), 13 FORDHAM L. REv. 117 (1944). Lotteries: Commonwealth v. Payne, 307 Mass. 56, 29 N.E. (2d) 709 (1940), 29 GEO.
L. J. 651 (1941). Mental defect less than "insanity": 31 KY. L. REv. 83 (1942).
Misprision of felony: People v. Lefkovitz, 294 Mich. 263, 293 N.W. 642 (1940),
54 HARV. L. REv. 506 (1941), 8 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 338 (1941), 4 UNiv. DET.
L. J. 119 (1941).
Longer Discussions:
"Charging of one Theft as Several Larcenies; a Series of Thefts as One Larceny," 40 MICH. L. REv. 429 (1942); Hitchler, "Common Law Felonies in
Pennsylvania," 48_ DICK. L. REv. 57 (1944); Stumberg, "Criminal Appropriation of
Movables-a Need for Legislative Reform," 19 TEX. L. REv. 117, 300 (1941);
Moreland, "Criminal Negligence and Crimes by Omission," 32 KY. L. J. 321 (1944);
Kirchheimer, "Criminal Omissions," 55 HARV. L. REv. 615 (1942); Stumberg, "Defense of Person and Property under Texas Criminal Law," 21 TEX L. REv. 17
(1942); Mikell, "Doctrine of Entrapment in Federal Courts,"'90 UNiv. PA. L. REv.
245 (1942); Hall, "Drunkenness as a Criminal Offense," 32 J. OF CmM. L, 297
( I 941) ; Schwenk, "General Principles of Criminal Law in Germany and the United
States; a Comparative Study," 15 TULANE L. REv. 541 ( 1941); Parker, "Insanity
in Criminal Cases," 26 CoRN. L. Q. 375 (1941); Harno, "Intent in Criminal Conspiracy," 89 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 624 (1941); Hall, "Mistake of Law and Mens Rea,"
8 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 641 (1941); Perkins, "Parties to Crime," 89 UNiv. PA. L.
REV. 581 (1941); Repko, "Premeditation and Deliberation in the Law of Murder,"
IO DuKE B. A. J. 36 (1942); Anderson, "Some Aspects of the Law of Entrapment,"
11 BROOKLYN L. REv. 187 (1942); Wolff, "Narcotic Addiction and Criminality,"
34 J. OF CRIM. L. 162 (1943); Selling, "Specific War Crimes," 34 J. OF CRIM. L.
303 (1944); "Those Weasel Words-Willful and Wanton," 92 UNiv. PA. L. REv.
431 (1944), relating to the meaning of the words in respect of liability for damages,
but suggestive, by way of analogy, of their indefiniteness in the criminal law.
II. Procedural Law:
Double Jeopardy: A helpful collocation of decisions was compiled by the American
Law Institute in its "Administration of the Criminal Law-Double Jeopardy-Proposed Final Draft." (Possibly procurable from the lnstitute's office, 3400 Chestnut
Street, Philadelphia).
.
Two deaths from a single fusillade. State v. Melia, 231 Iowa 332, I N.W. (2d)
230 (1941), 30 GEO. L. REV. 574 (1942).
Extradition: Uniform statutes relating to extradition of persons accused of crime,
and to compulsory attendance of witnesses from one state to another, have been adopted
in a number of states. See HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL, published by
Interstate Commission on Crime.
People v. Butts, 14 N.Y.S. (2d) 881 (1939), Note: "Extradition of Juveniles,"
39 MICH. L. REv. 157 (1940); Note: "Compulsion.of Out-of-State Witnesses," 19

RECENT DECISIONS

N.C.L. REV. 391 (1941); "Interstate Rendition-Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit,"
38 CoL. L. REv. 705 (1938).
A"esete: Warp.er, "Investigating the Law of Arrest," 26 A.B.A.J. 151 (1940),
discussing difference between conditions of modern life and those in which the laws
of arrest originated. Vogel, "The Degree of Reasonableness Required in Arrest without
a Warrant," 31 J. OF CRIM. L. 465 (1940); Perkins, "The Law of Arrest," 25 lowA
L. REV. 201 (1940); Warner, "The Uniform Arrest· Act," 28 VA. L. REv. 315
(1942).
Evidence: ''Wire Tapping and Law Enforcement," 53 HARV. L. REV. 863
(1940). Admissibility of testimony indirectly obtained through wire-tapping, Nardone
v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266 (1939); United States v. Goldstein,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 485, 55 HARV. L. REV. 141 (1941), affd., Goldstein
v. United States, 316 U.S. II4, 62 S.Ct. 1000 (1942). See also Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993 (1942). Warner, "How Can the Third Degree
Be Eliminated," l BILL OF RTS. REv. 24 (1940). Grant, "Constitutional Basis of
the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegally Seized Evidence," l 5 So. CAL. L. REv. 60
(1941).
Place of Trial: Blume, "The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases-Constiutional
Vicinage and Venue," 43 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1944).
Procedure in General: The Annotated volume of the American Law Institute's
MoDEL CoDE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, sets out not only what the Institute considers
sound rules, but in its Appendix correlates the existing laws of all jurisdictions. (Obtainable from the American Law Institute, 3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia.)
Discussed, 1937 ARK. B. A. 39, 303.
III. Penal Law:
Validity of statutes providing for sterilization of criminals, Skinner v. State, 189
Okla. 235, II5 P. (2d) 123 (1941), 55 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1941); 316 U.S.
535, 62 S.Ct. IIlO (1942), 41 MICH. L. REV. 318 (1942), 22 ORE. L. REV. 294
(1943).

